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Li and Weuve: China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions

CHINA’S AIRCR AF T C ARRIER AMBITIONS
An Update

Nan Li and Christopher Weuve

T

his article will address two major analytical questions. First, what are the
necessary and sufficient conditions for China to acquire aircraft carriers?
Second, what are the major implications if China does acquire aircraft carriers?
Existing analyses on China’s aircraft carrier ambitions are quite insightful but
also somewhat inadequate and must therefore be updated. Some, for instance,
argue that with the advent of the Taiwan issue as China’s top threat priority by
late 1996 and the retirement of Liu Huaqing as vice chair of China’s Central
Military Commission (CMC) in 1997, aircraft carriers are no longer considered
vital.1 In that view, China does not require aircraft carriers to capture sea and air
superiority in a war over Taiwan, and China’s most powerful carrier proponent
(Liu) can no longer influence relevant decision making. Other scholars suggest
that China may well acquire small-deck aviation platforms, such as helicopter
carriers, to fulfi ll secondary security missions. These missions include naval diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and antisubmarine warfare.2
The present authors conclude, however, that China’s aircraft carrier ambitions
may be larger than the current literature has predicted. Moreover, the major
implications of China’s acquiring aircraft carriers may need to be explored more
carefully in order to inform appropriate reactions on the part of the United
States and other Asia-Pacific naval powers.
This article updates major changes in the four major conditions that are
necessary and would be largely sufficient for China to acquire aircraft carriers:
leadership endorsement, financial affordability, a relatively concise naval strategy that defines the missions of carrier operations, and availability of requisite
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technologies. We argue that in spite of some unresolved issues, these changes
suggest that China is likely to acquire medium-sized aircraft carriers in the medium term for “near seas” missions and for gaining operational experience, so
that it can acquire large carriers for “far seas” operations in the long term.
These four major conditions, or variables, can be either dependent or independent, depending on circumstances. Generally speaking, central leadership
endorsement of the idea of acquiring aircraft carriers may depend on whether
the required money and technologies are available and whether an appropriate
naval strategy is formulated. There are some circumstances, however, in which
central leadership endorsement may in fact make money and technologies more
readily available and appropriate strategy more forthcoming.3 Because of such
variation in the relationship among these four major conditions (variables),
each will be discussed separately.
The article has five sections. The first four examine changes in the four major
conditions of leadership endorsement, financial affordability, appropriate naval
strategy, and requisite technologies. The concluding section discusses the major
implications if China actually acquires aircraft carriers.
LEADERSHIP ENDORSEMENT
Liu Huaqing, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commander 1982–88
and a CMC member (and its vice chair 1992–97) from 1988 to 1997, strongly
advocated carrier operations; 4 however, this idea was not endorsed by members
of the central civilian leadership, like Jiang Zemin. Lack of funding and requisite technologies may have played a role, as well as a relatively low dependence
of China’s economy on external sources of energy and raw materials. More important, however, the proposal contradicted the “new security concept” Jiang
endorsed in 1997, which highlighted “soft” approaches to China’s maritime as
well as land neighbors. This concept contributed significantly to China’s signing
of a declaration of code of conduct over the South China Sea in 2002 and the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003 with Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) members, as well as to the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001.5 Because of these political and diplomatic initiatives,
the primary missions Jiang assigned to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) during his reign were rather narrow and limited, confined primarily to the defense
of national sovereignty; the integrity of China’s territorial land, air, and waters;
and deterrence of Taiwan from declaring formal independence.
Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang as the Chinese Communist Party general secretary in 2002 and became the CMC chair in 2004. He has required the PLA to
fulfi ll more expansive and externally oriented missions that were absent in
Jiang’s era: to secure China’s newly emerging interests in outer, maritime, and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/3
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electromagnetic space, and to contribute to world peace through international
peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. Hu has also endorsed a “far-seas operations” (远海作战) concept for the PLAN, one that implies some new level of
power-projection capability.6
Such a change is understandable for two reasons, both due to recent years of
rapid economic growth. First, China has begun to develop a stronger sense of
vulnerability stemming from its growing dependence on external energy and
raw materials, and it has become more interested in the sea-lanes that bring in
these resources. Second, investments overseas and the number of its citizens
working there are both growing. These factors should have made the idea of
acquiring aircraft carriers more acceptable to the central civilian leadership following Jiang’s retirement.
There are several indicators that this idea has been endorsed by the central
civilian leadership. On 6 March 2007, a PLA lieutenant general revealed to the
media at the annual National People’s Congress that a project to develop aircraft
carriers was proceeding smoothly. Ten days later, the minister of China’s Commission of Science and Technology in National Defense, Zhang Yuchuan, stated
that China would build its own aircraft carriers and that preparation was well
under way.7 More recently, a spokesperson of China’s Ministry of National Defense, Major General Qian Lihua, claimed that China has every right to acquire
an aircraft carrier.8 But more important, China’s defense minister, General Liang Guanglie, recently told the visiting Japanese defense minister, Yasukazu
Hamada, that China will not remain forever the only major power without an
aircraft carrier.9 All of these statements suggest that China has the intention to
acquire aircraft carriers. These forthright comments on such a politically sensitive issue would have been impossible had they not been endorsed by the central
party leadership.10
FINANCIAL AFFORDABILITY
One major reason for China’s past hesitation to acquire aircraft carriers was
a lack of funding. When Mao proposed at a CMC meeting on 21 June 1958 to
build “railways on the high seas”—oceangoing fleets of merchant ships escorted
by aircraft carriers—China’s defense budget was a mere five billion yuan/renminbi (RMB). Of that, only RMB 1.5 billion could be allocated to weapons acquisition, and out of this share the PLAN received less than RMB 200 million.
A 1,600-ton Soviet-built Gordy-class destroyer cost RMB 30 million, and the
PLAN could afford only four of them.11
The carrier project was again placed on the policy agenda in the early 1970s,
but financial constraints still prevented the initiation of a serious program.
From 1971 to 1982, China’s annual defense budget averaged about seventeen
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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billion RMB. Out of less than six billion allocated for weapons acquisition each
year, the PLAN could expect to receive only several hundred million, whereas
one Type 051 destroyer cost RMB 100 million. With the endorsement of party
leader Hua Guofeng in the late 1970s, China planned to acquire an eighteenthousand-ton light aircraft carrier, either through import or coproduction, and
it was to carry the British vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing (V/STOL) Harrier
aircraft. The project had to be scrapped, because the price asked by British suppliers was too high. Furthermore, Deng Xiaoping, succeeding Hua as the paramount leader, decided to cut defense spending in order to free up resources for
the civilian economy.12
From the middle to late 1980s, Liu Huaqing lobbied feverishly for carrier
operations. He proposed feasibility studies in the seventh five-year plan (FYP),
for 1991–95; research and development on key aspects of platform and aircraft
in the eighth FYP; and production
It appears that in the short run China is likely in the early 2000s. His plan was
to acquire a mediuim-sized carrier for limited, shelved, partly because of insufficient funding.13 While the defense
air defense–dominant missions.
budget had been increasing since
the early 1990s, its growth could not catch up with the rising cost of aircraft carriers, as modern designs integrated more advanced aircraft, air-defense systems,
and electronics. Funding priority was instead given to developing submarines.
By 2007, however, China’s finances had improved remarkably, with government revenue reaching $750 billion—lower than the $2.6 trillion for the United
States but higher than Japan’s $500 billion. China’s foreign exchange reserve
now ranked first in the world, reaching $1.4 trillion. As a result, China’s annual
formal defense budget had grown to $46 billion (RMB 350.9 billion). According to official estimate, about a third of China’s formal defense budget, or $15.3
billion that year, was used for weapons acquisition. Given that naval modernization is currently a high priority, the PLAN is probably now receiving several billion dollars a year just for weapons acquisition, and this figure is likely to grow
in coming years.14
Aircraft carriers come in a wide variety of sizes, costs, and capabilities. Taking into consideration the lower labor and material costs in China, the cost of
building a medium-sized, conventionally powered, sixty-thousand-ton carrier
similar to the Russian Kuznetsov class is likely to be above two billion dollars.15
But that cost is just the start, as a carrier needs aircraft and escorts. A Russian Su33 carrier-based combat aircraft costs fifty million dollars, so a notional carrier
air wing of about fifty Su-33s, several airborne early-warning (AEW) planes, and
a number of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and search-and-rescue helicopters
may cost more than three billion. A Russian Sovremenny-class guided-missile
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/3
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destroyer costs about $600 million, so an escort force consisting of a number of
guided-missile destroyers, frigates, and supply ships may cost more than four
billion dollars. That makes the likely total cost of one carrier battle group about
ten billion dollars; the price of two carrier battle groups, which is the number
that China is likely to acquire, would be around twenty billion. That cost, spread
over a period of ten years of development, would constitute only a moderate proportion of the projected naval weapons acquisition budget during that time. The
annual cost for regular training, maintenance, repairs, and fuel for two carrier
battle groups can be estimated at about 10 percent of the construction cost of
the carrier, or $200 million for each of the two battle groups. This is based on a
useful rule of thumb derived from U.S. experience. Such a figure can be readily
covered by another third of the annual naval budget, which is specifically allocated for such a purpose. This proportion, like the weapons acquisition proportion, is also likely to grow over the years as the defense budget grows because of
rapid economic growth.16
NAVAL STRATEGY
Leadership endorsement and fi nancial affordability are necessary for China to
acquire aircraft carriers, but they are not sufficient. A fairly concise naval strategy that defines the missions of the carrier battle groups is also needed. It is,
however, more problematic than the two previous conditions.
“Near-coast defense” (近岸防御) defined China’s naval strategy from the
1950s until the early 1980s. It highlighted counter–amphibious landing operations earlier against the Taiwan Guomindang government’s attempt to recapture the mainland and later against a possible Soviet invasion from the seas, and
as a result it did not require aircraft carriers. In the late 1980s, a “near-seas active defense” (近海积极防御) strategy, largely operationalized by Liu Huaqing,
was endorsed to replace near-coast defense. This strategy requires the PLAN to
develop credible operational capabilities against potential opponents in China’s
three “near seas”—the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea—or the
space within and slightly beyond the “first island chain,” which extends from
Kurile Islands through the main islands of Japan, the Ryukyu Archipelago, Taiwan, and the Philippines to Borneo.
According to Liu, at least two major issues within this expanded operational
space require aircraft carriers: “to solve the need for struggle against Taiwan
[independence] [解决对台斗争需要] and to resolve the dispute over the Nansha
[Spratlys] Archipelago [解决南沙群岛争端].” In operational terms, Liu believed
that “whether the attack type or the V/STOL type, they [aircraft carriers] are for
the purpose of resolving issues of [fleet] air defense and sea attack” (防空和对海
攻击问题). Liu particularly stressed that “the objective for us to acquire aircraft
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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carriers is not to compete against the U.S. and the Soviet Union.”17 This implied
that what Liu wished to acquire was a medium-sized, conventionally powered
platform for limited, air defense–dominant missions, not a large, nuclearpowered one for expansive, sea/land-attack-dominant missions.18
Of the two major issues, Liu clearly privileged the Spratlys dispute. For instance, he highlighted the need to compare the cost-effectiveness of employing
carriers and carrier-based combat aircraft as opposed to land-based aviation
divisions, combat aircraft, and airLeadership endorsement and financial afford- refueling tankers. This shows that
ability are necessary for China to acquire air- he was particularly concerned
craft carriers, but they are not sufficient. A fair- about lack of air cover for distant
naval operations over the Spratlys.
ly concise naval strategy is also needed.
However, naval operations over
Taiwan can be covered by land-based combat aircraft, even though, as Liu mentioned, without carriers, air operations over Taiwan could be more costly because
more airfields and land-based combat aircraft are needed due to the reduced loitering time in the air.19 The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 1997 retirement of
Liu Huaqing, which helped to consolidate further Jiang Zemin’s position as the
CMC chair, clearly contributed to the shelving of the PLAN’s carrier project.20
While articulating the near-seas active defense strategy in the 1980s, Liu
Huaqing stated that the PLAN would operate within and around the first island
chain, or in China’s near seas, for a long time to come. But he also suggested
that the growth of the economy and strengthening of science and technology
would translate into expansion of Chinese naval power in the long run. This
in turn would allow the PLAN to extend its operational range from the near
seas to the “middle and far seas” (中远海), or the space between the first and
second island chains, the latter stretching from northern Japan to the Northern
Mariana Islands, Guam and farther southward, and beyond. This would also
allow the PLAN to “strike the enemy’s rear” through exterior-line operations
if China’s coast, or interior line, were attacked by an opponent. Liu, however,
placed emphasis on the primacy of “near-seas operations” (近海作战为主) and
regarded “middle- and far-seas operations as [only] supportive and auxiliary”
(中远海作战为辅).21
By 2004, however, such an emphasis seems to have shifted somewhat. China’s
naval analysts, for instance, now argue that China’s naval strategy should shift
from near seas to far-seas operations.22 They hold that such operations are necessary because of China’s increasing vulnerability relating to distant sea-lanes
and choke points. China’s ever-expanding oceangoing fleet of merchant ships,
especially tankers, also needs to be protected, as does China’s growing overseas investment, and as do the increasing number of Chinese citizens living and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/3
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working overseas. Moreover, China’s prosperous coastline and resource-rich
exclusive economic zones and territories need to be secured where in dispute.
These areas, however, are difficult to secure, because they are so long and wide
and their flanks are so exposed. This problem extends into such close forward
positions as China’s near seas, which are partially blocked by the first island
chain, and the few exits through straits and channels are mostly narrow and
controlled by others, making it difficult to gain initiative by maneuvering out
through them. Many of the navies operating in these near seas are quite formidable, including the U.S., Japanese, Russian, Taiwanese, ASEAN-state, and
Indian navies. They render the PLAN more vulnerable, and they limit, and even
reduce the effectiveness of, the near-seas active-defense strategy for both deterrence and war fighting.23
According to China’s naval analysts, to alleviate vulnerability and enhance
effectiveness the PLAN needs to break out of interior-line constraints associated with the narrow and near seas within and around the first island chain.
Acquiring capabilities to operate in the far seas, the vast space beyond the first
island chain, would allow the PLAN to regain initiative and momentum. While
“interior-line operations require near-seas capabilities, exterior-line operations
are based on far-seas capabilities. . . . Far-seas capabilities make it possible to
carry out offensive operations and ambush and sabotage operations in the far
and vast naval battle-space beyond the first island chain, and would have the
effect of shock and awe on the enemy.” Forward operations and offense are central to naval combat, because oceans have few invulnerable physical objects on
which to base the defense, whereas naval platforms, once crippled, are hard to
restore. An emphasis on offense also helps to optimize naval force structure. It
is also more cost-effective, because as strikes become more long-range, precise,
and powerful, and therefore more lethal, defense becomes more expensive to
maintain. History also shows that a strategy of close and static defense led to the
decisive defeat of the Qing navy in the first Sino-Japanese War, in 1894.24
Far-seas strategy suggests that the PLAN needs to develop power-projection
capabilities that can operate effectively in the more distant western Pacific and
the eastern Indian Ocean. It also implies that the PLAN may come in direct confrontation with the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific—in, for instance, a competition for sea access and denial in a crisis over Taiwan. Moreover, in the worst
case, the PLAN may come into direct contact with the U.S. and Indian navies
in competition for vital sea-lanes in the South China Sea and eastern Indian
Ocean and for such choke points as the Malacca Strait. These scenarios may
require the PLAN to acquire large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, very different from the medium, conventionally powered carriers for limited missions
envisioned by Liu Huaqing. A key variable that may determine whether China
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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would acquire medium, conventionally powered carriers or the large, nuclearpowered ones is whether requisite technologies are available.
AVAILABILITY OF REQUISITE TECHNOLOGIES
Before discussing the specific carrier development route that the PLAN might
follow, it is useful to spend a moment talking about aircraft carriers in general.
Thinking about Aircraft Carriers
There are four main types of aircraft carriers operating worldwide today, as defined by their method of launching and recovering aircraft. The first—the most
capable but also the most expensive—is the “catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery” (CATOBAR) design. Originally created by the United Kingdom but
perfected by the United States, this design philosophy is currently employed by
the United States and France. Because catapults (currently using steam, though
electromagnetic catapults have been proposed) are necessary for heavy aircraft
capable of long range or heavy payloads (which in turn can perform a wider variety of missions at greater range), the CATOBAR carrier is generally considered
a prerequisite for a significant carrier-borne power-projection capability.
The second carrier design is the “short takeoff but arrested recovery” (STOBAR)
type. This design uses a rolling takeoff—often assisted by a ski-jump ramp—but
aircraft return on board via arrested recovery. Most current non-U.S. aircraft carriers
are of this type, including the Russian Kuznetsov class, a unit of which, Varyag, has
been acquired by China. A STOBAR carrier is generally much simpler to build and
maintain than a CATOBAR design but less capable, though it may still be a large, fast
ship. STOBAR is less appropriate for the strike role, so a decision to forgo catapults
may indicate intent to not perform the strike mission.
The third design, “short takeoff vertical landing” (STOVL), combines a rolling takeoff—often assisted by a ski-jump ramp—with vertical recovery. This is
the system Spain and the United Kingdom have used on their most recent units.
Britain is currently evaluating a variant called “shipborne rolling vertical landing,” or SRVL, for its new Queen Elizabeth class.25 As a general rule, aircraft capable of vertical landing can also take off vertically, but the performance penalty
is high; a rolling, ski jump–assisted takeoff maximizes load or range. A STOVL
design is likely be smaller than other types, but it still requires high speed to
generate wind over the deck. The STOVL design severely limits strike and longrange missions, but it is easier to build and maintain than types better suited
to those tasks. STOVL generally represents the minimum capability needed for
fighter-based air defense.
The fourth and final type is the “vertical takeoff and landing” (VTOL) carrier. Compared to STOVL, a VTOL design forgoes even more aircraft operational
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capability and allows for a slower (and thus less expensive) ship. Selecting VTOL
over STOVL generally means either that the ship is intended to operate only
helicopters, is designed for a function (e.g., amphibious assault) that constrains
performance, or is really envisioned only for noncombat or general support
missions. For fi xed-wing aircraft, the difference between STOVL and VTOL is
generally the presence in the former of a ski-jump ramp at the front of the flight
deck and the ability to make enough speed to generate wind over the deck.
Several general rules of thumb are useful when thinking about aircraft carrier size and capabilities:
• The more missions a carrier is to perform, the more aircraft it needs and the
bigger the ship must be.
• The longer the range or heavier the payload of the aircraft, the more likely
the carrier will need catapults and arrested recovery.
• The bigger the flight deck, the bigger the aircraft that can be operated.
Also, the faster the carrier, the bigger the aircraft that can be operated.
(Faster carriers require bigger propulsion spaces, so these factors are
complementary.) Some missions are best performed by bigger aircraft.
• Strike is a long-range, heavy-load mission, as is aerial refueling.
• One pays a penalty for VTOL capability. Even if the design of the aircraft
does not involve performance compromises, which is a big assumption, it still
takes extra fuel to take off vertically, because “there’s no such thing as a free
launch,” and there will be much more restrictive weight limits on what one
can “bring back” on landing—unused ordnance may have to be jettisoned.
VTOL is at best inefficient, and at worst affects overall combat capability.
• A large carrier is more efficient—that is, it carries more aircraft per ton of
displacement and can handle planes on board better than a small carrier.
Taken together, these considerations are powerful tools in analyzing what
a PLAN carrier might look like, based on discussions of design features on the
one hand—that is, “What can they do with what they intend to buy?”—and
missions on the other—that is, “What do they need to buy to do what they say
they want to do?” For example, the Russian-built Varyag is a ski jump–equipped
STOBAR design, displacing sixty to sixty-five thousand tons and with a long,
thousand-foot flight deck. This makes it a relatively large carrier, smaller than
an American Nimitz but larger than the French Charles de Gaulle, roughly comparable to both the American Kitty Hawk class and the British Queen Elizabeth.
Note that one must be careful comparing displacements: with large, capacious
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ships like carriers, the difference between empty, full, and standard loads can be
tens of thousands of tons.
Due to the lack of catapults, fixed-wing aircraft on Varyag are essentially constrained to air superiority—fleet air defense or offensive air—or relatively shortrange strike.26 Varyag was intended to operate with a steam propulsion plant capable of thirty-two knots, but when sold to China it reportedly had no engines.27
Russia officially categorizes this type as a “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser”;
the limited abilities of its embarked aircraft and its Russian-style heavy missile
load are consistent with this description.28 Its usual suggested role is to support
and defend strategic missile–carrying submarines, surface ships, and maritime
missile-carrying aircraft. In other words, while it may have some antiship capability, both in its aircraft and its missiles, it is not really designed to support
long-range strike missions.
Medium-Carrier Options
Major General Qian Lihua stated, in his November 2008 comment already cited,
that if China acquires an aircraft carrier, it will serve mainly the purpose of
near-seas active defense. Thus it appears that in the short run China is likely
to acquire a medium-sized carrier for limited, air defense–dominant missions.
For a medium, conventionally powered carrier intended for these purposes, the
requisite technologies are generally available. China has been analyzing Varyag
since 2002.29 The Chinese design and construction of super containerships,
tankers, and liquefied-natural-gas carriers should also be useful experience for
building the hulls of aircraft carriers, although carriers are much more complex
ships. China also has the simulation and testing facilities necessary for research
and development, such as large-scale ship-model basins and wind tunnels, and it
has been gaining engineering and technical assistance from Russia and Ukraine,
countries that have experience in designing and building medium-sized aircraft
carriers. Furthermore, specialized construction materials, such as high-grade
steel, can either be indigenously developed or acquired through import. Moreover, China has made substantial progress in information, automation, new materials, and maritime and space technologies, many of which can be integrated
into carrier construction. Finally, while major technical bottlenecks exist and
need to be resolved, China has experience in producing heavy steam and gas
turbines, of which several units can be grouped together to provide sufficient
speed and range.
For takeoff and landing, China is likely to choose a STOBAR design. China’s
naval analysts have identified several benefits of a STOBAR design over a
CATOBAR design. A STOBAR design, for instance, minimizes the space needed
for water and fuel storage, maximizes the energy available for ship’s propulsion,
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offers simpler production and maintenance, and reduces vulnerability to mechanical breakdowns, because of the absence of the steam catapult.30
Because the missions for medium carriers are more those of air cover for
naval operations than those of more distant sea and land attack, air superiority fighters with some sea/land-attack capabilities would be sufficient. In this
case, purchasing the Russian STOBAR-capable Su-33 combat aircraft, which can
carry eight air-to-air missiles and one or two antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs),
seems to be a realistic option, and indeed China has been negotiating with
Russia for such a purchase.31 In
China’s aircraft carrier ambitions may be larger the meantime, China may also
attempt to upgrade a land-based
than the current literature has predicted.
combat aircraft of its own, such as
the indigenous J-10 or the J-11B (a Chinese variant of the Russian Su-27), into a
carrier-based aircraft. At a minimum, such an attempt would probably involve
reinforcing the landing gears, wings, and fuselage of the aircraft for arrested
recovery, which puts heavier stress on these components than standard runway
landings.32
Similarly, China may purchase carrier-based Ka-31 AEW helicopters from
Russia. The Ka-31 can patrol for two to three hours on end, with a detection
range of 150 kilometers for sea targets and 100–150 kilometers for low-altitude
aircraft and ASCMs, and it can direct engagement against fifteen targets at one
time. Assisted by shipborne phased-array radars, these ranges and capacity are
sufficient for limited missions in the near seas. It is also likely that China may
upgrade its shipborne Z-8 (a variant of the French Super Frelon) to a carrierbased AEW platform and develop carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) with electro-optical, infrared, and radar sensors for intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance at sea. UAVs can patrol for a long time at
high altitude and are difficult to detect.33
The Chinese approach to carrier development is likely to be incremental.
Therefore, China may attempt to gain engineering and operational experience
by moving from smaller and simpler platforms to larger and more complex ones.
This means that the option of building small V/STOL carriers should not be
completely excluded.34 On the other hand, many Chinese naval analysts argue
that the missions that small carriers can accomplish are too limited, because the
number and types of aircraft they carry and their operational radii are too limited. To secure China’s eighteen-thousand-kilometer coastline, the “three million square km of maritime territories,” and the nation’s expanding maritime
interests, as well as to further learning and adaptation, these analysts believe,
building medium-sized carriers is more appropriate as the first step in realizing
China’s aircraft carrier ambitions.35
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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Large-Carrier Options
For far-seas operations, a medium-sized carrier may not be adequate. A
STOBAR design, for instance, limits aircraft takeoff weight and shifts the full
burden of takeoff propulsion onto the aircraft, thus increasing the amount of
fuel consumed at that stage. This restricts the fuel and weapons payload that an
aircraft can carry, thereby reducing its range, loitering time, and strike capabilities. STOBAR is also more affected by wind, tide, rolling, and pitching. Furthermore, it needs more flight-deck space for takeoff and landing, thus limiting the
parking space and having an adverse effect on takeoff frequency–based crisis
reaction. In comparison, the CATOBAR design, which is mostly associated with
large carriers, minimizes aircraft fuel consumption on takeoff, thus enabling
better payload, range, loitering time, and strike capability. Its runway requirement, while greater than in a V/STOL design, is also minimal, thus allowing
more flight-deck parking and faster launches, even simultaneous launch and
recovery, resulting in quicker crisis response.
CATOBAR designs can also launch heavier fi xed-wing AEW and ASW aircraft.36 For far-seas operations, AEW platforms are particularly indispensable.
China’s military analysts, for instance, are impressed by the American E-2C,
which can patrol up to six hours, monitor a sea area of 12.50 million square
kilometers, and track two thousand targets, directing engagements against forty
of them simultaneously. They believe that with its detection range of 741 kilometers for surface targets, 556 kilometers for aircraft, and 270 kilometers for
missiles and its ability to patrol 180–200 kilometers away from the carrier battle
group, the E-2C, together with the combat patrol aircraft, establishes a threehundred-kilometer outer air-defense perimeter, deeper than the range of most
ASCMs.37 Without a similar air-defense perimeter, Chinese analysts believe, a
Chinese carrier battle group would be a “sitting duck,” particularly if it engages
highly stealthy U.S. combat aircraft.
Similarly, far-seas operations require far-more-capable carrier-based combat
aircraft than does near-seas active defense. Such an aircraft should be capable of
high speed, large combat radius, long-range sea/land attack, and stealth.38 Finally, the tremendous thermal energy that a large carrier consumes, particularly for
propulsion and catapult-steam generation, suggests that a nuclear power plant is
preferable to a conventional one.
Because China has had no experience in building and operating an aircraft
carrier, acquiring a working, medium-sized carrier may be a necessary stage to
gain such experience in the near future. Nonetheless, China’s naval analysts are
particularly impressed by the large U.S. carriers, including their most advanced
iteration, the Gerald R. Ford class, and its related technologies.39 Further, there
are indicators that research has been done on tackling some major technical
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/3
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issues for constructing large carriers.40 The process of acquiring such carriers,
however, is likely to be costly and protracted.
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS?
In spite of unresolved issues, China is getting closer to realizing its aircraft carrier ambitions in terms of leadership endorsement, fi nancial affordability, naval
strategy, and requisite technologies. China is likely to develop medium-sized
aircraft carriers in the medium term for near-seas missions and to gain operational experience so that it can develop larger carriers for far-seas operations in
the long term. In this section we offer some thoughts on the potential missions
of such ships, the factors that go into defining those missions, and the regional
implications.
An aircraft carrier is not a solo-deploying ship. To be survivable in an intense
combat environment, it needs escorts to protect it. While China has acquired
new surface combatants with sophisticated antisurface and antiair capabilities,
it continues to lag behind in the area of ASW. Unless one is willing to assume
that the PLAN does not believe in the antisurface utility of submarines—a conclusion at odds with its own submarine acquisition efforts—the lack of antisubmarine escort capability implies at least one (and perhaps all) of the following:
• China intends to address its lack of ASW capability in the future and is
willing to accept increased risk in the short term, or
• China thinks that it has a solution to the ASW problem, or
• China does not envision its aircraft carriers as becoming the targets of
submarines.
All three are likely true to some degree, and indeed they may be interrelated.
Aircraft carriers are long–lead time projects, and it may be that China’s decision
makers have decided to start that program first, accepting that they may end up
fielding a carrier before its ASW support is ready. Or they may have decided that
they have a solution to the ASW problem in the form of mines—implying in turn
that they believe they can control the location of the battle—or through speed and
maneuver, which itself may be an argument for a big, fast nuclear carrier.
Or perhaps China does not expect to use its aircraft carriers against a firstclass opponent with submarine capability. For that matter, perhaps China does
not expect to use its carriers in combat at all. Many missions (such as those
detailed below) would either involve smaller regional powers, unable to mount
a significant submarine threat, or be strictly for peacetime. The United States
has traditionally viewed aircraft carriers as instruments of high-intensity combat, but their utility in other areas is significant. Imagine, for instance, a carrier
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providing surface-search capability via a small number of airborne assets. While
high-intensity carrier operations require frequent replenishments of jet fuel,
low-intensity ops could continue for weeks with minimal support, while maintaining a surge capacity if needed.41 Since China lacks overseas bases, it may be
willing to make do with a relatively small increase in capability in a given situation and hence be willing to operate carriers in ways the U.S. Navy is unlikely
to consider. For this reason, it will be very interesting to see how many and what
types of aircraft the PLAN decides is appropriate for its carriers.
It is important to note that while China understands the potential vulnerability of aircraft carriers to concerted attack, the problems facing China and those
facing the United States are not similar.42 U.S. Navy aircraft carriers operating in
the western Pacific face a sophisticated reconnaissance-strike complex of overthe-horizon radars, supersonic cruise missiles, and antiship homing ballistic
missiles. A PLAN aircraft carrier operating in the same geographic area has none
of these concerns; rather, a PLAN carrier has these systems backing it up.
With the above points as a backdrop, one can readily envision five PLAN carrier missions:
1. SLOC protection. In recent years China has become concerned regarding
its sea lines of communication through the Strait of Malacca and other
areas outside the range of its land-based airpower. Even more recently,
Chinese warships have undertaken antipiracy missions in the Gulf of
Aden. Whether the mission is constabulary or combative in nature,
an aircraft carrier provides useful capabilities, including facilitation of
extended surface-search capabilities via fixed-wing and helicopter assets,
and “visit, board, search, and seizure” via helicopter. Moreover, such a
mission would likely be welcomed by the international community—
including the United States.
2. Deployment to overseas crisis locations. Because Chinese overseas interests
have grown extensively, such deployment serves to deter threats to Chinese
overseas interests and reassure security of these interests.
3. Exclusive economic zone/territorial enforcement. China has extensive
territorial claims in the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands.
Small amounts of airpower in these areas—even just to maintain a surface
picture—could confer a tremendous advantage.
4. Humanitarian aid and disaster relief. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
demonstrated the utility of aircraft carriers in disaster relief operations,
both as helicopter-staging platforms and for the use of the powergeneration, water-purification, and medical capabilities aboard. Using a
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Chinese carrier in such a contingency would potentially produce a great
deal of prestige and goodwill for China, perhaps even more than would a
ship specifically designed for disaster relief, reassuring regional neighbors
as to Chinese intentions. Again, such a humanitarian deployment by the
PLAN would likely be welcomed by the international community.
5. Taiwan contingency. The prospect of the use of an aircraft carrier in
support of an invasion or coercion campaign is often cited. Given the
PLAN’s lack of proficiency in ASW, a PLAN carrier participating in such a
scenario would make a tempting target for opposing forces. Nonetheless,
it would have the potential to complicate the problem by increasing the
axes of attack, especially if U.S. entry into the conflict could be forestalled.
Even if a feint (after all, China’s close mainland air bases could generate
far more sorties than could one or two carriers), a carrier’s presence
would likely prompt the United States or Taiwan to “honor the threat” and
allocate forces accordingly, which could be significant in a short conflict.
For the first four missions listed above, a carrier seems like overkill, or
at best a suboptimal use of resources. In strict terms that is true, but China attaches great symbolic value to a Chinese aircraft carrier as physical evidence of
the nation’s coming of age as a great naval power. China may feel it gains more
through incidental use of an aircraft carrier in humanitarian aid/disaster relief
or other noncombat missions than it would with purpose-built (but less prestigious) platforms.
FINAL THOUGHTS
For regional conflicts short of full-scale warfare, a Chinese aircraft carrier has
the potential to complicate seriously the calculations of competitors in the region. The only nations in the region likely to be able to stand up against even
a modest Chinese air wing are Japan, South Korea, and, going a little farther
afield, India. A PLAN carrier would have the effect of extending Chinese air capabilities without requiring overseas air bases. Nonetheless, while a nuclear carrier may be homeported in China, supplying it with jet fuel, food, ammunition,
and other consumables becomes harder with distance. The U.S. Navy solves this
problem with an extensive series of overseas logistics bases and large, fast replenishment ships that support the operations of carriers, themselves operating
largely from the continental United States. Lacking such support mechanisms, a
Chinese carrier is likely to stay closer to home, but it may still require a Chinese
support presence overseas.
For the United States, a PLAN aircraft carrier is probably of little day-to-day
concern, at least until the PLA develops an ASW capability. In peacetime, the
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U.S. Navy is unlikely to consider a Chinese carrier a threat, and it may perhaps
even welcome Chinese assumption of great-power naval responsibilities in such
maritime constabulary operations as counterpiracy. In wartime, for the foreseeable future, a Chinese air wing is unlikely to threaten U.S. naval forces seriously,
and China’s limited ASW capability provides persuasive options to an American commander. This is not to say that a Chinese carrier would not complicate
American planning, however, as even threats that can be neutralized require
allocation of resources to do so.
In the short to medium terms, therefore, China’s acquisition of aircraft carriers offers more opportunities than challenges. Medium-sized carriers would be
for limited, air defense–dominant missions in local conflicts within the first island chain. They could be easily contained, being exposed and made vulnerable
by their large profi les in so limited an operational space. Developing such carriers would also divert funding from building advanced submarines or advanced
missiles that arguably pose greater threats. Also, carriers could perform nontraditional security missions that are compatible with the goals of other navies in
the Asia-Pacific region, thus contributing to maritime security cooperation.
In the long term, however, if China can overcome the technological obstacles
and gain the operational experience needed to build large, nuclear-powered carriers in substantial numbers and correct the deficiencies in its antisubmarine capabilities, the PLA Navy may pose more challenges than opportunities. Several
such carrier-based strike groups could project Chinese power beyond the “far
seas” to the still more distant and vast “near oceans” (近洋) and “far oceans” (远
洋). The much improved sensors, sustainability, stealth, networking, range, and
strike capabilities and self-protection of such highly integrated battle groups
could drive the cost of containing and fighting them much higher.
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